A Reexamination of Prosser\u27s Products Liability Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial Code Sales Warranty by Shanker, Morris G.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3
1979
A Reexamination of Prosser's Products Liability
Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of
Commercial Code Sales Warranty
Morris G. Shanker
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Morris G. Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial Code
Sales Warranty, 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 550 (1979)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol29/iss3/4
A REEXAMINATION OF
PROSSER'S PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CROSSWORD
GAME:
THE STRICT OR STRICTER LIABILITY OF
COMMERCIAL CODE SALES WARRANTY
by
Morris G. Shanker*
This is the third paper** in which Professor Shanker deals with the relationship
between the judicially developed strict tort theory ofproducts liability and sales war-
ranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. In his first article, published in 1965
shortly after the courtsfirst began accepting Professor Prosser's strict tort notions,
Professor Shanker argued that strict tort was hardly the revolution that it was her-
alded to be and criticized the judicial eclipsing of the Uniform Commercial Code in
products liability matters. In his second paper, Professor Shanker argued that the
Uniform Commercial Code legislatively had preempted the field, thereby preventing
thejudiciaryfrom properly adopting the strict tort theory, and that judicial decisions
holding otherwise were poorly and superficially reasoned In this paper, Professor
Shanker argues that strict tort, as it has ultimately developed, is substantively the
same as warranty liability under the Un/form Commercial Code. If anything, Pro-
fessor Shanker points out, the Un/form Commercial Code may actually offer a
higher level oproductprotection. Again, he urges a return to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code as the governing law in products liability matters.
A PERSONAL PROLOGUE
IN 1965, shortly after our courts began accepting Professor Pros-
ser's strict tort theory of products liability, I argued that it was
not the great step forward which its heralds had announced. To
* John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; B.S.E.E.
(1948), Purdue University; M.B.A., J.D. (1952), University of Michigan. The author has
been Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, the University of California
(Berkeley), Wayne State University, and the University of London (England). Prior to
entering the field of legal education, he practiced commercial law in Cleveland, Ohio, for
ten years.
** The two papers referred to are Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and
the Un/form Commercial Code: 4 Commentary on Judicial Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Com-
munication Barriers, 17 WEs. Rns. L. REv. 5 (1965) and Shanker, A Case of Judicial
Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), 1 AKRON L.
REV. 697 (1978).
REEXAMINATION OF PROSSER'S GAME
the contrary, I pointed out that those strict tort cases would have
been decided the same way using the warranty ideas found in the
Uniform Commercial Code. Still, it then struck me that there
might develop important substantive differences between these
two competing products liability systems. I thought this would be
regrettable, resulting in continued confusion and likely injustice.'
Over the years, my perceptions have changed. Contrary to the
present conventional wisdom, I have concluded that no substan-
tive differences, in fact, exist or ever existed between the two sys-
tems. The most recent judicial developments, I believe, confirm
this. Stating it another way, all that is now substantively accom-
plished under strict tort is equally obtainable under UCC sales
warranty law. If anything, UCC sales warranty may actually offer
a higher level of product protection than that obtainable under
strict tort theory. This paper will seek to demonstrate these
points.
If my perceptions are correct, one wonders why Professor
Prosser was successful in persuading our courts first to accept and
then to perpetuate his strict tort invention when the Uniform
Commercial Code was always there to provide at least as much
products protection, or likely more. Apparently Prosser succeeded
by serenading our courts with a melody of words that captured
and beguiled them.
I. THE MELODY OF WORDS
A. Following the Pied Pioer to Nowhere
Indeed, Prosser made it sound so appealing: a products liabil-
ity law which was "free of the intricacies of sales law" and all of
that "undesirable luggage" found in the former Sales Act or the
present Uniform Commercial Code.3 And this much desired ob-
jective could be so easily accomplished. According to Prosser, all
that need be done was to exchange certain words for others. Since
the whole problem was due to the single word "warranty," get rid
1. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Unform Commercial
Code: 4 Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers,
17 W. REs. L. REV. 5 (1965).
2. The literature on the law of products liability is overwhelming. Thus, it is well
nigh impossible to remember or to acknowledge all the sources which have contributed to
my thinking. Accordingly, the specific authorities in this article typically are intended to
be illustrative and not necessarily exhaustive.
3. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1133-34 (1960).
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of it and replace it with the words "strict liability."' 4 Stop saying
that a products liability action was one in contract. Say, instead,
that it was an action sounding in tort.'
Such was the beguiling melody of words that Professor Prosser
began singing in 1960.6 The American Law Institute soon joined
him;7 and it was not long before the American courts were follow-
ing this pied piper of products liability en masse and virtually
without question. Indeed, the courts have been marching to Pros-
ser's melody for nearly twenty years.
Exactly where has this procession led? It seems nowhere. Re-
cent developments confirm that the courts are engaged in a mas-
querade: they are doing today essentially what they would have
been doing under the Uniform Commercial Code, although their
actions have been masked with Prosser's new word labels.' But,
even as Little Buttercup observed:
Gild the farthing if you will
Yet it is a farthing still.'
B. The Nagging Preliminary Question
Before elaborating this thesis, there is an obvious preliminary
question that needs to be answered. As appealing and beguiling
as Prosser's new words were, how could they create a new body of
products liability law that is independent from and not controlled
by the Uniform Commercial Code? Professor Prosser (and later,
the courts) had complained bitterly that it was the Uniform Sales
Act with its legislative permission to a seller to diminish or relieve
4. Id. at 1134; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liabiliy to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 802 (1966).
5. Prosser, supra note 4, at 802-05.
6. Prosser, supra note 3; Prosser, supra note 4.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Interestingly, Prosser was the
"choir master" for the American Law Institute, or more precisely, chief reporter for the
SecondRestatement of Torts. As has been noted elsewhere, it was his persuasive leadership
that was instrumental in persuading the American Law Institute to adopt § 402A. For a
discussion of the reasoning set forth by the ALI, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment b (1965).
8. Cf. Freeman and Dressel, Warranty Law in Maryland, Product Liability Cases:
Strict Liability Incognito? 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 47, 75 (1975) (discussing the unique situation
in Maryland brought about by a non-Uniform amendment to U.C.C. § 2-316, and conclud-
ing "that while the scope of recovery allowed under the [Commercial] Code in Maryland
closely approaches that which might be available under strict liability in tort, it is neverthe-
less deficient in a few areas"). Maryland has since adopted strict tort. Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
9. Things Are Seldom What They Seem, in W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, H.M.S.
PINAFORE 79 (Oliver Ditson Co. ed. 1933).
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himself of warranty liability that was the problem.'° Yet, if the
statute authorized these sellers' "rights," could the courts really
avoid this legislative scheme simply by pinning a new label on the
plaintiff's action?
The legislative preemption problem becomes even more acute
in the context of the Uniform Commercial Code. Minimal re-
search demonstrates that the Code specifically and directly dealt
with the very Sales Act problems of which Prosser complained."
In most cases, the seller's "right" to avoid or diminish his liability
for selling defective products was much cut back.' 2 But, regard-
less of what the Commercial Code has done to a seller's substan-
tive liability, the important point is that our legislatures recently
and directly addressed themselves to the very problems which
troubled Prosser and came up with statutory solutions to them.' 3
Surely, these legislative enactments cannot be avoided simply by
the judiciary pinning new word labels on the plaintiffs claim. As
I stated previously,
How may a court under our system of law ignore a valid statu-
tory enactment covering a case which is before it? If the statute
intends that a seller's liability for his defective products may
entirely be excluded or partly limited, how can a court ignore
these statutory limitations by developing some kind of superior
case law?
14
This problem of legislative preemption was raised shortly after
Prosser began playing his new word game.' 5 But, for nearly a
decade, the courts in large measure simply ignored the issue or
assumed that it did not exist. 6 Indeed, it was not until 1973 that
10. Prosser, supra note 3, at 1131-33; Prosser, supra note 4, at 801; Prosser, Spectacular
Change: Products Liability in General, 36 CLEV. B.A.J. 149, 167 (1965).
11. Markle v. Mullholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 273-82, 509 P.2d 529, 537-39 (1973)
(O'Connell, C.J., concurring); Shanker, supra note 1, at 21.
12. Shanker, supra note 1, at 21-22.
13. Even Professor Prosser seemed to have grudgingly conceded that "given enough
time--say another decade--the sales law of warranties [in the UCC] might have worked
out a method of dealing effectively with these problems." But he was in a hurry to imple-
ment his theory of strict tort and "in the desperate hours of the fall of the citadel, there was
no such time." Prosser, supra note 4, at 801.
14. Shanker, supra note 1, at 11 n.20.
15. Franklin,. When Worlds Collide, 18 STAN. L. REv. 975, 1016 (1966); Rapson, Prod-
ucts Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code
and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuTGERS L. REv. 692 (1965); Shanker, supra note 1, at 11
n.20; Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 4024 and the Unform Commercial Code,
22 STAN. L. REv. 713, 751-59 (1970). Indeed, the preemption problem was being raised as
early as 1961 by Professor Dickerson. Dickerson, The Basis ofStrict Products Liability, 17
Bus. LAW. 157 (1961).
16. But see Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
1979]
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the New Jersey Supreme Court first squarely met the problem and
declared that the Uniform Commercial Code had not preempted
the judicially developed strict tort doctrine. t7 Since then, nearly
every court which has faced the preemption question has followed
suit. 18 Despite this near judicial unanimity, the preemption ques-
tion will not go away. During the past several years, commenta-
tors have been again demanding that the courts explain how they
accomplished their tour deforce under our system of law.' 9
The preemption problem has been adequately covered else-
where in the literature,2° and thus will not be discussed again here.
As stated, this article takes quite a different tack. Its major thesis
is that strict tort substantively has accomplished little, if anything,
which would not have been obtained under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Thus, as it has turned out, strict tort essentially has
been an exercise in futility-perhaps an interesting, albeit confus-
ing, word game, but one which has had minimal substantive im-
pact. For this further reason, our courts in products liability
matters ought to stop singing Prosser's beguiling melody of words.
They ought to abandon this pied piper's procession and return in-
stead to the place which they never should have left, namely, the
Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, like it or not, this essentially
is the very place where the courts, without realizing it, have al-
ways been.2 '
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (accepting the supremacy of the UCC ). For a discussion of the total
rejection by Massachusetts state courts of the strict products liability theory in favor of
UCC warranties, see note 38 infra.
17. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 157, 305 A.2d 412, 427 (1973). A criticism
of this and other judicial decisions reaching this result is found in Shanker, A Case of
Judicial Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), II AK-
RON L. REv. 697 (1978).
18. E.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352-53, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976) (holding that Maryland's adoption of the UCC did not preempt the judicially cre-
ated strict tort action since there were "significant differences between the two theories").
This decision is criticized in Shanker, supra note 17, at 715-16.
19. Brickley, Products Liability in Kentucky. The Doctrinal Dilemma, 65 Ky. L.J. 593,
621 (1977); Dickerson, Products Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of Section
402,4, 44 TENN. L. REV. 205 (1977); Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's, 2
HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1974); Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery ofEconomic
Loss in American Products Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 666 (1977); Shanker,
supra note 17. Professor Walkowiak apparently finds these commentators' arguments to be
persuasive, but feels that the preemption problem today "is of only mild historical inter-
est." Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept ofDeective Goods: "Reason-
ableness" Revisited, 44 J. AIR LAW & COMM. 705, 707 (1979).
20. See notes 15-19 supra.
21. The judicial development of strict tort is now bringing about legislative reactions.
See Draft Unform Product Liability Law, 44 FED. REG. 2996 (1979); Bivins, The Products
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II. WORD EXCHANGE NUMBER ONE: "STRICT LIABILITY" FOR
"WARRANTY"
What exactly was accomplished when the courts accepted Pro-
fessor Prosser's suggestion to exchange the words "strict liability"
for the word "warranty"? The impression left on the unschooled
is that the words "strict liability" have enhanced the quality of the
goods which a seller must deliver. Witness such judicial pro-
nouncements as strict liability is "imposed [as a matter of] law"22
or to protect the "public interest";23 that it does not depend on the
seller's "will" or "intention" as set out in the underlying sales
agreement; 24 and indeed, that it was developed to prevent the
seller from "defin[ing] the scope of its own responsibility for de-
fective products .. ."25
A. Warranty" An Equal or Higher Quality Standard
Leaving this impression may give a warm glow to those judges
who believe that in developing strict tort they are marching in the
mainstream of consumer justice. But, if they seriously believe that
strict liability has given or ever was intended to give a higher level
of quality protection to a consumer than that always available
through warranty, then they have reasoned superficially and erro-
neously. It would be a poor Commercial Code lawyer who could
not draft a sales agreement containing express warranties or a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which required prod-
uct quality far in excess of that which anyone has ever obtained
through strict tort liability concepts. And indeed, Professor Pros-
Liability Crisis, 11 AKRON L. REv. 595 (1978). If the Uniform Commercial Code, as I
submit, already controls the field legislatively, one wonders whether this new separate leg-
islation is needed or desirable. Would it not make better sense to design any new legisla-
tion-if any is needed-by amending the Uniform Commercial Code rather than by
developing still another legislative scheme to deal with these same problems? See Shanker,
supra note 1, at 17, 47.
22. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
23. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1360-62 (Okla. 1974) (losses
should be borne by those who can control defective products because it is in the "public
interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the
public. . ."); see also, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) ("The purpose of such liability is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from the defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves.").
24. Eg., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d at 1362.
25. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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ser himself recognized this. As he stated: "But the seller's strict
liability may be enlarged by his express representations [i e., ex-
press warranties]. ' ' 26 What so often is overlooked is that the Uni-
form Commercial Code recognizes three quite different
warranties: (1) the express warranty,27 (2) the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose,28 and (3) the warranty of
merchantability. 29 No one has ever seriously contended that strict
tort liability competes with the first two warranties. Its battle has
always been only with the merchantability warranty, a warranty
which arises whenever a merchant sells his regular merchandise.3
Of course, a sale by a merchant of his regular merchandise in-
volves preciseo the same set of conditions which is required to
trigger strict tort liability.31
What then is the difference between the two; in particular, is
there a difference between the product quality level required by
strict tort liability and that required by the merchantability war-
ranty? Almost every commentator who has seriously studied the
problem has concluded that there is no difference; that strict tort
liability requires the seller to deliver the same quality of goods as
that required under the merchantability warranty.32 Several
courts have expressly agreed with this proposition.3 And, even
26. Prosser, supra note 4, at 834 (emphasis added). For a recent application of this
principle, see Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978). The court in
a personal injury case questioned whether liability could properly be imposed under strict
tort concepts. However, it had no difficulty finding liability for breach of an express war-
ranty.
27. U.C.C. § 2-313.
28. Id. § 2-315.
29. Id. § 2-314.
30. Id. §2-314(1).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(a) (1965); St. Luke's Hospital v.
Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 359, 534 P.2d 781, 784 (1975) ("The threshold question to the
liability of such a [strict tort] claim is a sale in fact of the marketed product."). Courts have
extended by analogy the strict liability ideas found in strict tort and the merchantability
warranty to nonsales situations. See, e.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873,
877-78, 538 P.2d 1177, 1181-82 (1975) (discussing authorities that extend implied Code
warranties to nonsales situations); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973).
32. Eg., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7, at 295 (1972) ("[W]e would find the terms nearly synonymous
...."). See also Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 903 n.91, 928-29 (1967);
Shanker, supra note 17, at 698-99, 701.
33. Eg., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965) quoted
in Kessler, supra note 32, at 903 n.91 ("[Ilt may fairly be said that the liability which
[§402A of the Restatement] would impose is hardly more than what exists under implied
warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer," etc.); Wolfe v.
Ford Motor Co., - Mass. App. Ct. -, 376 N.E.2d 143, 150 (1978) (noting 2 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3-1 to 3-7 (1978)) ("the two bases of liability are
Vol. 29:550
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when courts do not articulate such express agreement, they seem
to assign to strict tort the very same attributes that are found in the
merchantability warranty. Thus, in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bush-
nell Manufacturing Co.,34 the court, after studying the many defi-
nitions for product quality proposed by the leading authorities on
strict tort, concluded:
Although the definitions of the term "defect" in the context of
products liability law use varying language, all of them rest
upon the common purpose that those products are defective
which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner
reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended
function. 5
This sounds strikingly similar to the merchantability test set out in
U.C.C. section 2-314(2)(c) that requires a merchantable product
to be "fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used."
In a more recent example, the California Supreme Court, the judi-
cial leader in developing strict tort, has now conceded that its orig-
inally developed strict tort standard was "somewhat analogous to
the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty of fitness and
merchantability [U.C.C. sections 2-315 and 2-314 and] ...re-
flects the warranty heritage upon which California products liabil-
ity in part rests."36 In this same decision, the California Supreme
Court then went on to "invent" an alternative standard to be used
in determining when design errors (as opposed to production de-
fects) would cause the goods to fall below the required strict tort
quality standard.37 But, within a year, the Massachusetts
identical. .. "); Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 253 N.E.2d 207,
210, 305 N.Y.S. 490, 494 (1969) ("We would merely add that both parties appear to agree,
and we believe correctly, that strict liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of
privity are merely different ways of describing the very same cause of action."); Reid v.
Eckerds Drugs, Inc. 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344, 348 (1979) ("We likewise find any
distinctions between tort and contract in this warranty action to be artificial and unneces-
sary to our consideration of merchantability."); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 26
U.C.C.R.S. 1128, 1133 (D.C. App. 1979) (" '[T]he current doctrines of implied warranty
and strict liability in tort are but two labels for the same legal right and remedy, as the
governing principles are identical.' ") (quoting Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc.,
262 A.2d 807, 808 (D.C. App. 1970)).
34. 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
35. I1d. at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403-04 (emphasis added). This definition recently was
reexamined and again approved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Il1.2d
203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978), rehearing denied, Jan. 25, 1979.
36. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 236 (1978).
37. According to the test propounded by the court, the trier of fact would be required
to weigh the risk of danger inherent in the design against the benefits it offered. Id. at 430,
573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. In so doing, consideration should be given to "the
gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger
1979]
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Supreme Judicial Court adopted the very same ap-
proach-indeed, the very same language-to state the law which
governed design defects under the UCC merchantability warranty
standard.38
To summarize, it seems amply clear that the level of product
quality required by strict tort is no more than that required by the
merchantability warranty. Indeed, some commentators have sug-
gested that, if anything, merchantability actually will benefit the
consumer in more cases than would be true under strict tort liabil-
ity. 3
9
Comparing strict liability with only the merchantability war-
ranty much oversimplifies the problem. The fact of the matter is
that a seller's warranty liability is the totality of the three warran-
ties that can arise under the Commercial Code.4" More precisely,
one, two, or all three of these warranties can arise in a particular
would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an
improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternative design." Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
38. Back v. Wickes Corp., - Mass. -, 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (1978). Massachusettes
has never accepted strict tort but instead has decided all of its products liability cases under
UCC warranty. In Swartz v. General Motors Corp., - Mass. -, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1978),
the Massachusetts court has reaffirmed that it will continue with this approach. Part of the
court's rationale was based on preemption, particularly by reason of non-Uniform amend-
ments added to the Massachusetts Commercial Code dealing with (1) removal of privity as
a defense, (2) prohibition of any disclaimer of merchantability warranty, (3) allowing duty
to give notice of defects as a defense only to the extent that the defendant was prejudiced,
and (4) running the statute of limitations from date of injury or damage. Except for the
statute of limitations, it seems likely that the Massachusetts court could have achieved the
same results on all of these points under the Uniform version of the Commercial Code.
For a discussion of these points, see notes 55-62 & 106-25 infra and accompanying text.
The critical point here is that the non-Uniform Massachusetts amendments in no way
affected or varied the content or substance of the UCC sales warranties, including the im-
plied warranty of merchantability.
Differences between the Massachusetts (UCC) and California (strict tort) approaches
might develop in the area of evidence. Compare U.C.C. § 2-607(4) ("The burden is on the
buyer to establish any breach [of warranty] with respect to the goods accepted.") with
Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237
(1978) (the burden of proof will be upon the manufacturer to demonstrate that an injury
producing product is not defective in design).
39. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 295 (strict tort standard "does not
purport to reach all defective goods. . ."). See also Schenk v. Pelkey, 25 U.C.C.R.S. 416
(Conn. 1978). There the injured plaintiff lost his strict tort case through an adverse jury
verdict. Nevertheless, the Connecticut Supreme Court directed that the plaintiff be given
an additional opportunity to prevail under an implied warranty of merchantability theory.
The court stated that it was a controversial question whether the products liability standard
required by strict tort and merchantability warranty were the same. The court did not,
however, find it necessary in the case to resolve the question. Id. at 420.
40. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 29:550
17EEXAfMINdATION OF PROSSER'S GAME
sale. And when more than one warranty does arise, the seller's
responsibility typically will be measured by the one requiring the
highest level of quality.4 Further, as will be discussed later, any
attempt by agreement to reduce all warranty protection below that
of merchantability standards would likely be declared uncon-
scionable, particularly where consumer goods are involved.42
B. Strict Liability: Old Words for an Old Idea
What, then, explains these unthinking judicial suggestions that
strict liability gives better quality protection than would be avail-
able under UCC warranties? Judge Levin, in Cova v. Harley Da-
vidson Motor Co., has suggested that the courts may have
confused strict liability with the quite different concept of absolute
liability which arises in cases involving dangerous activities. 43 Be-
cause of this potential confusion, Judge Levin condemned the la-
bel "strict liability" as being either "oversimplification,
exaggeration, or simply misleading."'
I am inclined, however, to believe that the error arises because
so many of our authorities just have not read their legal history.
They apparently believe that the words "strict liability" are a new
set of words which Prosser invented to represent a new legal con-
cept. But in fact the words "strict liability" are the very same
words used to describe a seller's liability arising from breach of
warranty! They are the words which bring home the startling idea
in our legal system that the seller's liability does not depend upon
fault.45 Rather, so long as any warranty arises from a sales agree-
ment, then the seller is responsible for its breach, even though the
breach was not caused by his wrongdoing. Indeed, the liability
exists even though the seller had been extraordinarily careful in
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of the goods. It is in this
sense that the words "strict liability" have long been used, namely,
to describe the no-fault nature of warranty liability.
46
41. U.C.C. § 2-317(c). For a discussion of estoppel defenses available to the consumer,
see U.C.C. § 2-317, Official Comment 2.
42. See notes 81-103 infra and accompanying text.
43. 26 Mich. App. 602, 614-15, 182 N.W.2d 800, 806 (1970).
44. Id. See also Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Okla. 1974),
where the Oklahoma Supreme Court discarded the strict tort liability label in an "attempt
to avoid the semantic confusion of and relationship of tort to common law negligence."
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ("[N]either care nor negli-
gence, neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor ignorance will save defendant.").
46. Hanson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1960) ("The
seller has bound himself unqualifiedly as to the existence of the characteristics or qualities
1979]
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Professor Prosser himself recognized this. In his two major ar-
ticles developing the strict tort liability doctrine, nearly every case
which he used to describe the quality level which strict tort would
require were merchantability warranty cases under the Sales Act
or the Commercial Code. Prosser himself made clear that his sug-
gesting the words "strict liability" in place of "warranty" was not
for the purpose of developing a different standard of quality
which sellers of goods would have to meet.47 Rather, it was to
assure that the quality standard already imposed, particularly by
the merchantability warranty, was not denied a consumer, partic-
ularly a remote consumer, by what Prosser considered the "intri-
cacies of contract law"48 which also were incorporated into the
sales statutes. He explained that
[i]t would be easy . . . to overestimate the significance of the
change [brought about by section 402 A of the Restatement and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ], which is more one of
theory than of substance. It is only the rules of contract which
have been jettisoned, where there is no contract. The substance
of the seller's undertaking remains unaffected; and as Chief
Justice Traynor himself has agreed, the precedents of the "war-
ranty" cases will still determine what he must deliver. They
will also determine the extent of his liability, except insofar as
limitations derived from the law of contracts have been ap-
plied. No case has been overthrown unless it has applied such
a contract limitation.49
The contractual limitations, those intricacies found in sales stat-
utes which Prosser wanted to kill off, will be discussed later.50 At
this point, it is important only to emphasize that, so far as Prosser
was concerned, strict liability in tort was simply a new analytical
tool by which contractual limitations and the other intricacies of
warranted; and absolute liability against the warrantor is available to the buyer who is
injured by the non-existence of such characteristics or qualities. (quoting Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 249, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1958)) ...
[M]anufacturer[s] ought to be held to strict accountability. ... ); Rivera v. Berkeley
Super Wash Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 328, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654, 665 (1974) (Benjamin J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he principle [is] that liability for a breach of warranty is 'strict' only in the
sense that no element of fault is involved."); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 286
("Section 2-314 [of the UCC] offers a form of strict liability .. "); Kessler, Products Lia-
b/ip, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 898 n.56, 899 (1967) ("warranty liability is strict liability .... ";
"sellers of defective goods are, on principle, strictly accountable for injuries to remote par-
ties .. . ").
47. "No one disputed that the 'warranty' [under a sales statute] was a matter of strict
liability." Prosser, supra note 4, at 802.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 804-05.
50. See notes 104-25 infra and accompanying text.
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sales law might be eliminated.5 ' Nothing more. But, Prosser
surely would have been surprised if told that his new strict tort
theory placed upon a professional seller the duty to deliver a
higher quality or safer product than that already imposed by the
warranty of merchantability.
This is not to say that that definition of what constitutes mer-
chantable goods under the Commercial Code is an easy problem.
Nor is it to suggest that the Commercial Code has frozen the judi-
cial role in continuing to develop that definition. What I have
said is that the very same problems that have existed and will exist
in defining the quality level required and defenses permitted by
strict tort would have been similarly resolved if, instead, the courts
had been proceeding under the Commercial Code's
merchantability warranty."
To summarize, strict liability is not a new set of words, nor was
it an attempt to increase the quality or safety level of products
which a seller manufactures or distributes. Thus, when the courts
infer otherwise, they are simply mistaken. The words "strict lia-
bility" are nothing more than a shorthand way of indicating what
professional sellers knew long before Professor Prosser, strict tort,
and Restatement Section 402A appeared on the scene: namely,
they are liable for breach of the merchantability (or any other)
warranty, even though that breach was not due to their negligence
or other fault.
III. WORD EXCHANGE NUMBER Two: "TORT" FOR
"CONTRACT"
A. Tort: A New Ana'ytical Tool
The major analytical tool which Prosser thought would ac-
complish his objective was to change the basic theory of a strict
liability action from one sounding in contract to one sounding in
tort. Since tort was imposed as a matter of public policy, then, as
Prosser saw it, it could not be disclaimed by contractual agree-
ment; nor could it be limited by the contractually associated ideas
of privity, disclaimer, notice, and election of remedy, i e., those
"annoying intricacies" of sales law. In Prosser's view, "[T]he
[new] rule stated is purely one of strict liability in tort. . .[and] is
not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to
51. Prosser, supra note 4. at 801; Prosser, supra note 3, at 1128-33; Prosser, supra note
10, at 167. Compare Shanker, supra note 1, at 19.
52. See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
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surround such sales."53 Indeed, making this change in legal the-
ory would, Prosser thought, kill entirely the notion that a seller's
strict liability even depended upon a contractual agreement be-
tween the parties or the concomitant notion that anyone had "re-
lied" upon the seller's contractual representations regarding his
product. As he stated:
[W]arranty had become so closely identified to the legal profes-
sion with the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant,
that it was attended by contract rules. Traditionally it has al-
ways required some reliance by the plaintiff upon an express or
implied assertion; and this was often lacking on the part of the
user.
54
B. Merchantability" A Matter of Law
It is here that Prosser made his fundamental error. He was
quite wrong in suggesting that the merchantability warranty
which gave rise to the seller's strict liability regarding his products
needed either agreement or reliance by the buyer to bring it about.
To the contrary and certainly under the Uniform Commercial
Code, the merchantibility warranty does not arise because the par-
ties have bargained for it. Rather, it arises as a matter of law,
simply because a merchant has sold an item from his regular stock
of goods." Thus, when the courts almost universally declare that
the merchantability warranty liability under the Commercial
Code "is a contractual remedy created solely by the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code and the terms of the contract be-
tween the buyer and the seller,"' 56 they display a regrettable na-
ivete about the Uniform Commercial Code. Under the Code's
terminology, a rule of law which binds the parties who have en-
tered into a sales agreement automatically becomes a part of the
"contract" between them. 7 This is so not because the parties vol-
untarily agreed to that rule of law, or bargained for it; rather, it is
53. Prosser, supra note 4, at 802-03.
54. Prosser, supra note 4, at 801. See also, Prosser, supra note 10, at 167.
55. "The warranty arises independently of the sales contract and is imposed by law."
Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 694, 699 (1978). See also Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed
Prods., - Ind. App. -, 366 N.E.2d 3, 18 (1977); Collela v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., -
N.H. -, 386 A.2d 1283, 1285 (1978); L. VOLD, LAW OF SALES 426 n.10 (2d ed. 1959).
56. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 595, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 192,
374 N.E.2d 97, 103 (1978) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). A comparable statement was
made by the majority. Id. at 589, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187-88, 374 N.E.2d at 99.
57. U.C.C. § 1-201(11).
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an additional consequence imposed by the law and automatically
made a part of the "contract."
To elaborate, the Commercial Code carefully distinguishes be-
tween the statutory words "agreement" and "contract." The word
agreement is what the parties have actually agreed to-their bar-
gain, in fact. The "contract," however, is "the total legal obliga-
tion '58 which exists between the parties; and this obligation can go
beyond the terms agreed upon by the parties, by reason of "appli-
cable rules of law" found in the Commercial Code.59 This Code
approach is hardly a new idea. In 1927, the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated it this way:
An implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of
an agreement. It is not one of the essential elements to be
stated in the contract, nor does its application or effective exist-
ence rest or depend upon the affirmative intention of the par-
ties. It is a child of the law. It, because of the acts of the
parties, is imposed by the law. It arises independently and
outside of the contract. The law annexes it to the contract. It
writes it, by implication, into the contract which the parties
have made.60
To repeat, the merchantability warranty arises under U.C.C.
section 2-314 simply because a professional seller (ie., a
merchant) has sold from his regular stock of goods. No further
agreement, beyond the underlying agreement to sell his regular
goods, is needed. This, of course, is a carbon copy of the approach
followed by strict tort. It, too, is triggered when a professional
seller of goods enters into an underlying sales agreement.6' Once
he has done so, then as a matter of law the seller becomes bound
to the strict liability imposed by strict tort. Thus, both under the
Commercial Code and strict tort, the seller's strict liability is in-
voluntary: it is added to the sales agreement by rule of law.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 89, 216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927). See also authori-
ties cited in L. VOLD, supra note 55, at 451. Curiously, Professor Prosser acknowledged this
approach. Citing Bekkevold as well as cases dating back to 1898, he noted that warranty
could arise "without any intent to make it a matter of contract ... and exist between
parties who have not dealt with one another." Prosser, supra note 3, at 1127. Nonetheless,
as stated in the text, Prosser insisted that the new tort theory was needed for these actions
because "the concept of warranty has involved so many major difficulties and disadvan-
tages that it is very questionable whether it has not become rather a burden than a boon to
the courts in what they are trying to accomplish." Id.
61. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The courts have extended by
analogy the strict liability concepts found in both theories to nonsales situations. See note
31 supra.
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Under the Commercial Code this involuntary liability is automat-
ically incorporated into the parties' contract as part of their total
legal obligation. The failure of the courts to recognize the invol-
untary nature of the merchantability warranty liability and their
erroneous suggestion that it arises by reason of the parties' "agree-
ment" calls to mind Professor Dickerson's statement that, "Most
American lawyers and judges simply have never learned how to
deal with statutes. 62
C. Disclaimer of Merchantability Warranty
Granting that the merchantability warranty arises as a matter
of law, can it be disclaimed or limited by agreement between the
parties? There is no doubt that the Uniform Commercial Code
envisions the possibility that even the merchantability warranty
can be disclaimed under very limited and controlled circum-
stances.63 In particular, it is required that there be a conscionable
agreement voluntarily and knowingly entered into between the
parties.' 4 Nevertheless, one court after another has seized upon
the Commercial Code's mere possibility of disclaimer as a major
reason for stating that strict tort, which the courts state will not
tolerate disclaimers, gives to consumers better protection than that
afforded under the Commercial Code.65
D. But Strict Tort Disclaimers are Permitted
These judicial statements need to be examined carefully. Al-
most all of them were dicta. Typically, these judicial statements
were made as an additional reason to justify the court's initial
adoption of the strict tort theory, even though the validity of a
disclaimer was not in issue, or necessary for the decision of the
case. In those strict tort cases in which an actual decison had to be
made on the validity of a disclaimer, they usually have been al-
lowed. Further, they have been allowed under the same circum-
stances which would move a court to hold that the disclaimer was
conscionable under the Code. Thus, the first strict tort court
which had to decide (and not just talk about) a disclaimer noted
that "parties to a contract may agree to limit their liability as long
62. Dickerson, The ABC's ofProducts Liability--With a Close Look at Section 402(A)
andthe Code, 36 TENN. L.REv. 439, 453 (1969).
63. U.C.C. § 2-316; see notes 81-102 infra and accompanying text.
64. U.C.C. § 2-316.
65. Eg., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 349-50, 363 A.2d 955, 961-62
(1976).
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as the limitation is not violative of public policy."66 The court
upheld the disclaimer because commercial parties were involved
who had the power to write the contract as best suited themselves
and there was "no showing that plaintiff was precluded from ne-
gotiating a contract on more favorable terms. 67 These very same
factors, no doubt, would have moved a court operating under the
Commercial Code to recognize that the disclaimer was permissi-
ble because it was a conscionable one.
Perhaps the best judicial statement recognizing the right of the
parties to disclaim strict tort liability comes from the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. In Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. RJ Enstrom
Cor. ," the court made these pertinent comments:
A social policy aimed at protecting the average consumer by
prohibiting blanket immunization of a manufacturer or seller
through the use of standardized disclaimers engenders little
resistance. But when the setting is changed and the buyer and
seller are both business entities, in a position where there may
be effective and fair bargaining, the social policy loses its raison
d'etre. The transaction then tends to be more influenced by
gravitational pull of the Uniform Commercial Code than by
the consumer oriented § 402A.
Since the Code is tolerant of disclaimers and limitation clauses
within certain defined limits, that same philosophy would be
equally approving of a negotiated waiver of § 402,1. Such a limi-
tation on comment m would avoid the not unfamiliar result of
"overkill' when a legal principle completely valid in its original
context is extended so far that the mischief caused may be
equal to the original disorder sought to be remedied.
We conclude therefore that Pennsylvania law does permit a
freely negotiated and clearly expressed waiver of § 402A be-
tween business entities of relatively equal bargaining
strength.69
Only one court, the Tenth Circuit in SternerAero AB v. Paige Air-
66. Moreira Constr. Co. v. Moretrench Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 391, 394, 235 A.2d 211,
213 (1967).
67. Id. at 395, 235 A.2d at 213.
68. 499 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1974) (plaintiff corporation brought suit to recover
damages for helicopter purchased from defendant under contract stating: "Customer takes
'as is' without warranty of any kind .... ").
69. Id. at 149 (emphasis added and citations omitted). See also Idaho Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 26 U.C.C.R.S. 638 (Idaho 1979) (contractual limitation of liabil-
ity effective between commercial corporations notwithstanding adoption of strict tort liabil-
ity in Idaho); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1978) (in
discussing the validity of a contractual limitation of liability in a commercial case, the court
stated that the plaintiffs rights should be limited to those provided by the Code "whether
the complaint is cast in terms of strict liability in tort or negligence").
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motive, Inc. ,70 seems expressly to have held that a disclaimer sim-
ply is not possible under strict tort. That court, a federal court
deciding a diversity case, apparently concluded that it was bound
by an earlier statement of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Kirk-
land v. General Motors Corp.71 that contractual disclaimers would
not serve as a valid defense to strict tort liability. It should be
noted, however, that the Oklahoma Court's statement was not
necessary to the decision of the case, but rather part of the original
judicial merchandising of strict tort to the state of Oklahoma.7 z
Yet, the statement, albeit dicta, was there and the federal court in
this diversity case apparently felt Erie-bound to follow it.73
The Oklahoma decision deserves further comment, for it is
among the most curious in our recent legal jurisprudence. First,
the court adopted strict tort despite the absence of a "case" or
"controversy" on the subject. Moreover, the court decided not
only the narrow issue before it, but also wrote a treatise-all
dicta--on what strict tort would thereafter be in Oklahoma. It
was this dicta that contained the no-disclaimer statement which
the federal court in Sterner Aero felt bound to follow. Not sur-
prisingly, this Oklahoma decision has been the subject of criti-
cism. 74
It is difficult to understand why Prosser asserted that strict tort
liability could not be disclaimed or limited by contract. Our law
has long recognized that most tort liabilities can under consciona-
ble conditions be disclaimed. (Indeed, Prosser's own treatise on
torts discusses the principle.)75 As a result, it appears that a better
case can be made for permitting disclaimers and limitations of
70. 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (corporate purchaser of rebuilt aircraft engine
brought suit for damages to plane downed by engine failure on takeoff; parties had negoti-
ated express, written, limited warranty in lieu of any implied warranty).
71. 521 P.2d 1353, 1362 (Okla. 1974). The Kirklandcourt quoted with approval Com-
ment m of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
72. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
73. 499 F.2d at 713.
74. McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never Be Effective? The
Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA L. REV. 494, 516-23 (1975); Shanker, supra note 17, at 698.
Products liability law in Oklahoma recently took another interesting twist. In Barker v.
Allied Supermarket, 26 U.C.C.R.S. 597 (Okla. 1979), the Oklahoma Supreme Court de-
clared that notwithstanding the Kirkland decision, it "still recognizes the Commercial Code
as an independent basis for an implied warranty cause of action." Id. at 607. Thus, plain-
tiffs in Oklahoma seem to have the delightful choice of proceeding under the strict tort
doctrines laid down in Kirkland, or under UCC warranties, whichever suits their purposes
better. For an apparent criticism of this approach, see Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265 Or.
259, 273-80, 509 P.2d 529, 537-38 (1973).
75. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 442-45 (4th ed. 1971).
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products liability than for other torts. Strict tort, after all, is a no-
fault liability; traditional tort liability is based on some fault or
wrongdoing. If the parties can in a conscionable fashion bargain
away fault liability, then, a fortiori, they should be able to bargain
away no-fault liability.
It is generally recognized that the language needed to disclaim
or limit tort liability must be express and fairly specific. Ironically,
that standard has been used to invalidate disclaimers of strict tort
liability, because the disclaiming language was only that author-
ized by the Uniform Commercial Code as sufficient to disclaim
warranty liability. Such was the decision of the Third Circuit in
Keystone Aeronautics.76 Having recognized that disclaimers were
possible under strict tort because conscionable disclaimers which
have been fairly bargained for were "more influenced by gravita-
tional pull of the Uniform Commercial Code,"7 7 the court curi-
ously then held that the very words authorized by the Code for
obtaining the disclaimer did not meet the specificity requirements
for a tort case. How wrong, how futile, and how ironic is this
decision! It is wrong because it ignores a legislative authorization
to use those particular words to bring about disclaimer. As such,
tho~e who drafted that disclaimer understood and knew full well
the consequences of those words. The decision is futile because it
represents the state of the law for only a short period of time;
thereafter, ironically, only the unwary will be trapped. Once a
decision invalidating a strict tort disclaimer on this basis has been
published, it is not long before counsel realize that the disclaimer
objective can be readily accomplished simply by adding a new set
of magic words to the underlying sales agreement.78 And, indeed,
counsel have already acted on this reality. Thus, the disclaimer
clauses found in today's sales agreements often contain not only
the disclaiming language authorized by the Code, but also the spe-
cific, magic words necessary to disclaim tort liabilities. And when
these additional "tort" words have been added to the agreement,
the disclaimer of tort liability has been upheld.79
76. 499 F.2d at 150, discussed at text accompanying note 68 supra.
77. Id. at 149.
78. E.g., JIG The Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d
171, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gee, J., dissenting).
79. Marr Enterprises Inc. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir.
1977). See also Atlas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore Dry Kiln Co., 30 Or. App. 111, 589 P.2d 1134
(1979) (contract limiting remedies for any liability arising "from any cause" is enforceable,
even though suit is based on strict tort or negligence).
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E. The Special Problem of Personal Injury. Maintaining the
Merchantability Standard
The strict tort cases discussed in the previous section which
authorized disclaimers each involved situations between commer-
cial parties who had suffered only property loss. Even Professor
Prosser seems to have recognized that limitations and disclaimers
in this context were permissible.80 His major concern (and appar-
ently the major concern of most strict tort authorities) was that the
disclaimers might be upheld under a sales statute, even though a
personal injury to a consumer was involved. 8' Because most cases
involving consumer personal injury since the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code have been decided under a strict tort
theory, we have few current UCC decisions on this exact point.
Nevertheless, it appears that the various unconscionability and
good faith doctrines written into the Commercial Code would pre-
vent disclaimers which take away the rights of a consumer who
has suffered personal injury.
This is perfectly clear when the seller has made any one of the
three Commercial Code warranties.8 2 In such a case, the attempt
to limit or disclaim personal injury recovery for breach of that
warranty is expressly declared prima facie unconscionable.83
Even consumers not in privity are assured of this protection since
the Code prohibits a seller from denying them the benefit of any
sales warranty.84 These specific Code rules will protect almost all
of the injured consumers since very few consumer articles are sold
without one of the three Code warranties. Indeed, competitive
factors almost make this a necessity.
Also worth noting is that the mere description of goods gives
rise to an express warranty that the goods will meet the minimum
80. Prosser, supra note 3, at 1133 ("Commercial buyers are usually quite able to pro-
tect themselves.").
81. Id.
82. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
83. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). There seems to have been little, if any, judicial discussion of
the "prima facie" language. Presumably, it is intended to permit disclaimers or limited
remedies when dealing with unavoidably unsafe products-for example, certain drugs.
The strict tort authorities apparently would not object to limitations of liability under these
conditions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965); Prosser,
supra note 10, at 169; Shanker, supra note 1, at 40 n.124. The "prima facie" language may
also permit conscionable disclaimers where used goods are being sold. See Chamberlain v.
Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967).
84. U.C.C. § 2-318, particularly Alternatives B and C. For a discussion of the privity
doctrine under the Code, see text accompanying notes 106 & 107 infra.
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features of an article carrying that description.85 Thus, the sale of
an automobile requires that the article delivered meet the mini-
mum features of an automobile. Presumably, this includes a com-
bination of machinery which will operate on the roads with some
degree of safety. The failure of the automobile to meet these min-
imum safety features would result in a breach of the express war-
ranty of description. Thus, under the rule in U.C.C. section
2-316(1), injuries resulting from that breach would be recover-
able, despite any contrary language in the contract.8 6
It is difficult to imagine cases in which the express warranty of
description did not exist, or would not protect an injured con-
sumer who has suffered personal injury. Assuming arguendo that
such a case might exist, one must face the question whether the
Commercial Code would ever permit a professional seller to get
away with a contractual clause which disclaimed entirely his war-
ranty of merchantability. As has been previously suggested,87
posing the question this way is a bit misleading. The real issue is
whether all three of the Commercial Code warranties successfully
could be disclaimed in a case involving consumer goods which
caused personal injury. No court is likely to object to a total dis-
claimer of the merchantability warranty if the sales agreement
provided superior protection by an express or implied warranty of
fitness. The crucial question will arise when a contractual clause
seeks to eliminate all warranty protection or, more precisely, to
reduce it to less than that normally available under the merchant-
ability warranty. 8 The consensus of those who have addressed
the question seems to be that such contractual disclaimers would
not be tolerated by the Commercial Code.89
The Commercial Code has a series of rules which seems delib-
erately written to invalidate any such gross attempt. Briefly, these
rules include the following:
1. Any description of the goods gives rise to an express war-
ranty (which cannot be negated) that the goods will meet that
85. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b) and Official Comment 4.
86. For further discussion on this point, see Shanker, supra note 1, at 40 n.124.
87. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
88. Some states have amended their version of the Code to prohibit the disclaimer of
the merchantability warranty. Eg., MD. COMM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1(2) (1975);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Michie/Law Co-op. 1976).
89. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 n.12 (Alaska 1976)
and authorities cited therein; R. NORDSTROM, THE LAW OF SALES § 88, at 274 (1970); I.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, § 12-11, at 392; Shanker, supra note 1, at 43 n.135.
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description.9°
2. Contractual disclaimer and limitation clauses which deny
a buyer a fair minimum quantity of remedy when the goods are
defective are prohibited.91
3. A merchant seller must act in good faith and in accord-
ance with the reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
his trade.92
4. U.C.C. § 2-302 generally prohibits unconscionable con-
tract clauses. Indeed, the Code's Official Comments expressly in-
vite any disclaimer of the merchantability warranty to be carefully
scrutinized for any unconscionable effect. Pointing out that un-
conscionability principles are, among other things, intended to
"prevent oppression and unfair surprise," 93 the Comments also
state: "The warranty of merchantability, wherever it is normal, is
so commonly taken for granted that its exclusion from the con-
tract is a matter threatening surprise and therefore requiring spe-
cial precaution."94 It is also worth noting that the New Jersey
court in the famous Henningsen case 9 5-said by Prosser 96 and
others to mark the inception of strict tort-actually relied upon
the Code's unconscionability section to invalidate a limitation of
remedy to a consumer.97
Indeed, the reasons given by the courts as justification for strict
tort-public policy, the inequality of bargaining power between
consumers and commercial sellers, the social necessity of assuring
that consumers have remedies for physical injuries-are the same
kinds of reasons which would move a Commercial Code court to
declare a total disclaimer or limitation of the merchantability war-
ranty liability to be invalid under one or more of the above
rules.98 And, in fact, the Official Comment to the Code's uncon-
90. U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(b). See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
91. U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Comment 1.
92. Id. §§ 1-203, 2-103(l)(b).
93. Id. § 2-302, Official Comment I.
94. Id. § 2-314, Official Comment 11.
95. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959).
96. Prosser, supra note 4, at 791.
97. 32 N.J. at 390-91, 161 A.2d at 86-87.
98. In Henningsen, the relevant factors establishing unconscionability were the adhe-
sive nature of the disclaimer, id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 87, and the "gross inequality of bar-
gaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile industry." Id. at 391, 161 A.
2d at 87. In Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 285 (Alaska 1976), the court
noted that Code-authorized "disclaimers and limitations cannot be so oppressive as to be
unconscionable and thus violate [U.C.C. § 2-302]." "Particularly close judicial scrutiny is
warranted when a manufacturer exacts a liability disclaimer or remedy limitation from a
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scionability section states that its very purpose is "to make it possi-
ble for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or
clauses which they find to be unconscionable" and to permit such
policing directly without the necessity of turning to "public pol-
icy" arguments.99
As stated, almost all of the cases involving consumer personal
injury since the enactment of the Commercial Code have been
decided under the strict tort theories.'00 Thus, few Code decisions
exist which directly test this thesis. But the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, at least by way of dictum, seems to have approved
it. 1 1 In addition, there are commercial loss cases where various
kinds of disclaimers and limitations, even those agreed upon be-
tween highly sophisticated and knowledgeable parties, have been
invalidated because the commercial loss was due to latent defects
not readily observable to the buyer or because the limitation failed
to give the "fair quantum of remedy" which the Commercial
Code requires. 02 If such disclaimers are invalidated when com-
mercial losses are involved, then invalidation should follow with
more force when a contractual clause has denied at least the
merchantability level of protection to a consumer personally in-
jured by an unknown or unobservable defect.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the recently enacted Federal
Warranty Act 0 3 as a matter of federal law maintains merchant-
ability protection with respect to consumer items when any kind
of written warranty regarding the useful life or duty to repair is
consumer who enjoys little or no bargaining power in the marketplace." Id. at 292, n.43.
Also, see the list of cases specifically approved as illustrating the unconscionability princi-
ple in U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1. See also Industralease Automated & Scientific
Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977); L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, § 19.07(6), at 5-214 to 5-217; Kessler, supra note
32, at 906-07; Shanker, supra note 1, at 43 n. 135.
99. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1.
100. See page 568 supra.
101. Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 403 n.8 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing with
apparent approval L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, § 19.07(6)).
102. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968),
aI'd in part and rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970) (involving latent chemical
defects not discoverable by ordinary inspection and testing until after the product had been
manufactured and sold); Desert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454
S.W.2d 307 (1970) (involving seed with defect which could not be discovered until after the
crops began to grow).
103. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 108,
15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976). Some states have also amended their version of the Code to pro-
hibit the disclaiming of the merchantability warranty. See note 88 supra.
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given. As stated, this seems to cover most of the consumer goods
that are sold in today's marketplace.
F. The Other Intricacies of Sales Law
It has been argued above that strict tort does not produce a
higher level of product protection for a consumer than does the
Commercial Code. In particular, no agreement is necessary to
give rise to the merchantability warranty. 0" Further, any attempt
to disclaim that warranty or limit the remedies for a breach
thereof is likely to be given the same effect as that produced under
strict tort. 0 5
So what is left of strict tort? In what ways would it ever bring
about a result different than that obtainable under the Uniform
Commercial Code? In other words, beyond contractual disclaim-
ers, how do strict tort and the Commercial Code compare with
respect to those other "intricacies of sales law" which were used to
justify the strict tort development? To analyze this question, the
issues of privity, notice, miscellaneous defenses, and the statute of
limitations will be addressed.
1. Privity: Professor Prosser viewed privity as an unaccept-
able "intricacy of sales law."'0 6 Indeed, this probably was the
prime driving force which motivated Prosser's efforts to develop
strict tort. This question need not be discussed at length, however,
since previous studies make clear that the elimination of the priv-
ity defense was as easily obtained under the Commercial Code as
under strict tort.'07 And, when a particular state has adopted ei-
ther Alternative B or C of U.C.C. section 2-318, then the legisla-
tive scheme itself goes as far in eliminating privity as does strict
tort. 
0 8
104. See notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 66-102 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 1099-103. Indeed, the citadel referred to in the title
of that article and his later article, Prosser, supra note 4, is the "citadel of privity." The
term was coined by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174
N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
107. Shanker, supra note I, at 24-27.
108. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C in the same section provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the opera-
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2. Notice: The duty of an injured party to give notice of de-
fective goods was another one of those intricacies of sales law
which troubled Prosser."°9 Strict tort dispenses with a notice re-
quirement;110 the Code requires notice of defect or injury within
reasonable time.' This area has also been explored previously
and these studies make clear that consumers, particularly consum-
ers not in privity, have either no or, at best, a minimal duty of
notice." 2 Between whatever minimal notice duty exists under the
Commercial Code and the no-notice approach under strict tort, it
really seems that the Commercial Code has struck the fairer bal-
ance. "'13 Surely it offends one's sense of fairness to permit an ag-
grieved party to say nothing about his claim to the defendant until
the lawsuit is filed, which could well be the day before the statute
of limitations runs.' 14
3. Miscellaneous defenses: Are there defenses unique to war-
ranty which might not be allowed under strict tort? It seems not.
Rather, almost every defense permissible in the one area has been
recognized as available under approximately the same conditions
in the other. For example, both strict tort and merchantability
recognize that while a misuse of the products is a defense, a rea-
sonably foreseeable misuse is not.' Similarly, both agree that
proper warnings or instructions about the use of the product must
be given or else the seller will be responsible." 6 And, recent de-
velopments indicate that both theories recognize that comparative
negligence, sometimes referred to as equitable apportionment of
fault, is available to divide or apportion the plaintiffs loss.' ' In-
tion of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty extends.
109. Prosser, supra note 4, at 829.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
111. U.C.C. § 2-607(3). It should be noted, however, that UCC notification require-
ments are minimal, requiring merely that the buyer inform the seller that the transaction is
claimed to involve a breach. Id. § 2-607, Official Comment 4. As might be expected, the
reasonableness of the time for notification is judged by stricter standards where a merchant
buyer is involved than where the purchaser is a retail consumer. Id.
112. Shanker, supra note 1, at 45.
113. Kessler, supra note 32, at 905.
114. See id But see Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 I11. App. 3d 344, 350, 378
N.E.2d 1083, 1089 (1978), where the filing of the suit nearly four years after the injury was
held to be timely notice. The case involved a consumer who had suffered a stroke after
ingesting an oral contraceptive.
115. Back v. Wickes Corp. - Mass.-, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978); Prosser, supra note 4, at
824 n. 173.
116. Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., - Mass. App. Ct. -, 376 N.E.2d 143 (1978).
117. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 ('rex. 1978); Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
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deed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that this result was
commendable because it achieved "the sensible posture that simi-
lar actions are subject to the same defense.""' 8
4. Statute of Limitations: The overwhelming amount of liti-
gation involving the relationship between strict tort and UCC
warranties has involved the statute of limitations. The battle has
been fought vigorously whether strict liability, be it under the war-
ranty approach or strict tort approach, should be governed by the
UCC statute of limitations or a tort statute of limitations." 9 Yet,
curiously, this is the one matter which Prosser hardly mentioned
in his two classic articles which developed the strict tort theory.'20
Ironically, while its supporters have sought to justify strict tort
on the basis that it would give more consumer justice, in most
cases the UCC statute of limitations would give the injured con-
sumer a longer period within which to sue. Thus, if justice is
measured by the length of time which a consumer has to bring his
strict liability action, the UCC warranty approach ought to be de-
clared the winner. Tort statutes of limitations tend to be short, the
usual period being two years.' 2' In the typical case, the Code
would allow a minimum of four years from delivery.' 22 In fact,
when a warranty explicitly extends a guarantee of performance
into the future, which is so often the case with consumer goods,
then the consumer injured by the product typically will be allowed
four more years beyond the date of his injury to bring the ac-
tion. 23
It seems that there is only one kind of case where the tort stat-
ute of limitations can give a greater length of time for bringing a
suit. That is the case where the sales warranty does not explicitly
118. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1977).
119. For the competing arguments, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Mendel
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
The majority opted for the UCC statute of limitations; the dissent argued that the torts
statute of limitations should have been used. Subsequently, the dissent's view was adopted
in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975). Viclorson probably represents the majority view today, although some strict tort
jurisdictions still embrace the UCC statute of limitations. E.g., Patterson v. Her Majesty
Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Oklahoma apparently permits the injured
plaintiff to take advantage of the statute of limitations that will do him the most good.
Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 26 U.C.C.R.S. 597 (Okla. 1979). For further discussion of
Barker, see note 74 supra.
120. Professor Prosser mentions the statute of limitations only casually. Prosser, supra
note 3, at 1126.
121. Eg., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (1978 Supp.)
122. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) to -725(2).
123. Id.
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extend to future performance, and the injury occurs more than
four years after delivery of the goods. In that case, the consumer's
rights under the Code would be cut off. Under a tort statute of
limitations, the consumer would still have available his tort limita-
tion period, measured from the date of injury.
Of course, simply having the right to bring an action more
than four years after delivery does not mean that the consumer
will win it. He will still have to prove the defect as of the date of
delivery, and the practical likelihood that he can succeed in this
effort certainly is not high.' 24 In any case, whether some outside
limit should be set for cutting off strict liability (le., no-fault)
claims against a seller, even though the injury has not yet oc-
curred, is the subject of debate. Almost every legislature which
has considered the problem has found that this is a wise social
policy; and it seems that it is primarily the judiciary which dis-
agrees with that choice.
125
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The basic theme of this paper has been expressed many times
before. In Shakespeare's words, "a rose by any other name would
smell as sweet."'' 26 Even Little Buttercup noted:
Things are seldom what they seem
Skimmed milk masquerades as cream...
Gild the farthing if you will
Yet it is a farthing still.' 27
So it is with strict tort. It masquerades as something differ-
ent-indeed, something better than sales warranties. Yet it seems
to be the old farthing which has been gilded but yet remains a
farthing. Or, to put it more precisely, strict tort seems simply to be
new words inscribed on essentially the same warranty package.
Strict tort has brought about substantively little, if anything,
which was not already available under the Uniform Commercial
124. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 404, 335 N.E.2d 275, 279,
373 N.Y.S.2d 39,44 (noting the dissent in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d
340, 351, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 499 (1969)).
125. Shanker, supra note 17, at 710 and addendum. For a summary of recent legisla-
tive activity on this subject, see Bivins, The Products Liabiliy Crisis, 11 AKRON L. REV.
595, 611 n.68 (1978) and the other authorities in note 21 supra. Contra, MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 106, § 2-318 (Michie/Law Co-op 1976) (beginning a breach of warranty action at "the
date the injury and damage occurs"). For a discussion of the development of this section,
see Swartz v. General Motors Corp., - Mass. -, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1978).
126. W. SHAKESPEARE, TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET 29 (Folger Library ed. 1959).
127. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 79.
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Code. It has given legal scholars the opportunity to discuss the
interrelationship between the Commercial Code and strict tort
"with all the zeal, fury, and abstruseness of medieval theolo-
gians"; 28 and legal scholars have no doubt enjoyed the exercise.
But, for those who must live with these competing products liabil-
ity systems and their different labels, it seems only to have brought
about an enervating, costly, and confusing word game which
hardly was worth the effort. Ironically, in this crossword game of
products liability, the words describing strict tort and those
describing commercial warranty liability mean essentially the
same thing.
128. Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 38, 260 A.2d 111, 112 (1969).
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